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ARTICLE 
 
UP IN THE AIR:  
ANALYZING WHETHER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
PREEMPTS STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS 
 
Max Birmingham* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     This Article addresses the question of whether the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
preempts state common law claims1 brought by private parties against a 
pollution source within the state. At issue with preemption is whether 
Congress undoubtedly exercises this power.2  
     The Supremacy Clause is a stalwart that courts use to impose the 
preemption doctrine.3 The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution establishes that the Constitution and federal laws are “the 
supreme law of the land” and that federal law preempts “any state law . . . 
[that] ‘interferes with or is contrary to federal law.’”4 The court begins its 
analysis by interpreting the statutory construction of the law.5 However, the 
																																								 																				
* B.S., State University of New York at Empire State College; M.B.A., Northeastern 
University D’Amore-McKim School of Business; J.D./M.J., Michigan State University College 
of Law. The Author would like to thank Maria Filipakis; Jonathan Evans; Nicole Sigurdson 
Nan, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP; Lauren C. Nichols, Director of the Amagansett Free Library; and 
last but certainly not least, the editors, staff, & faculty advisor of the Liberty University Law 
Review. 
1.  For purposes of this Article, the term “state common law claims” shall refer to state 
common law claims that are pertinent to the coverage of the Clean Air Act, or more specifically 
negligence, nuisance, and tort. 
2.  William Cohen, Congressional Power To Define State Power To Regulate Commerce: 
Consent and Preemption, in COURT AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE 523, 523, 537 (Sandalow & Stein eds., 1982) (“Congress’s power to 
preempt state laws which affect interstate commerce is . . . unquestioned. . . . With reference 
to preemption, the problem has been to define the standards for deciding when Congress has 
in fact exercised that power.” And, “[t]hus, the issue, in pre-emption cases, simply stated, is 
not what Congress has the power to do, but what Congress has done.”). 
3.  See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of 
the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829 (1992); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: 
The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988).  
4.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). 
5.  See, e.g., Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Congressional Preemption Held To 
Prevent State from Enforcing Stricter Pollution Standards Against Nuclear Electrical Power 
Plant: N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1971) (“Preemption is 
a doctrine of statutory construction”). 
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statutory language is rarely clear and unambiguous. Courts may rely on 
congressional intent by pointing to legislative history to support 
interpretations of legislative intent that are at odds with the statutory 
language.6 In many instances, the issue of preemption is determined through 
analysis of congressional intent.7 “When Congress is unclear about its intent 
to preempt, the courts must then decide whether preemption was intended 
and, if so, to what extent.”8 After examining congressional intent, the analysis 
then turns to the scope of the preemptive law.9 Congress intends for the CAA 
to set federal law as the standard and leave no room for state law.10 In 1970, a 
summer riddled with “daily air pollution alerts” left “little doubt . . . that the 
country was facing an air pollution crisis.”11 A Senate committee found that 
the problem was “more severe, more pervasive, and growing at a more rapid 
rate than was generally believed.”12  
     State common law claims brought by private parties against a source of 
pollution within the state should be preempted by the CAA. The CAA 
delegates the responsibility for enforcing the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (“NAAQS”) to the states.13 The CAA mandates that states must 
each create a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which is overseen by the 
EPA.14 A state is first divided into Air Quality Control Regions, which are 
ranked according to their compliance with the NAAQS.15 For states that are 
																																								 																				
6.  See generally Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” 
and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975). 
7.  Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (“The purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone [of preemption analysis].”). 
8.  145 CONG. REC. S6857, 6874 (daily ed. June 10, 1999) (statement of Sen. Levin).  
9.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1996) (“[A]ny understanding of the 
scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a ‘fair understanding of congressional 
purpose.’” (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516)). 
10.  In the 1967 Act, states were given the first opportunity to develop air quality standards. 
Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108, 81 Stat. 485, 491–92. Congress included 
provisions that allowed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“Department”) to 
develop federal air quality standards, where a state failed to do so. Id. In the 1970 Act, Congress 
took away this power from the states and granted the EPA exclusive authority. Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–79 (amending the 
existing CAA to create a new section 109). 
11.  116 CONG. REC. 42, 381 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie).  
12.  S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 1 (1970). 
13.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1994) (requiring every state to establish a “plan which 
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such [National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards] in each air quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State”). 
14.  See id. 
15.  See Id. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY, 595 (8th ed. 2018).  
2020] UP IN THE AIR  57 
	
 
	
not in compliance with the NAAQS, fines may be issued in order to compel 
compliance.16 
     This argument proceeds as follows. Part I provides an introduction. Part 
II examines the Supremacy Clause and defines the preemption doctrine. Part 
III provides an overview of the evolution of the Clean Air Act. Part IV 
distinguishes the Clean Air Act from the Clean Water Act. Part V analyzes 
the courts that hold that the CAA preempts state common law claims. Part 
VI analyzes the courts that hold that the CAA does not preempt state 
common law claims. Part VII identifies how failing to hold that the CAA 
preempts state common law claims would be subject to reductio ad 
absurdum. Part VIII concludes. 
II. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND DEFINING THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
     The root of Congress’s power of preemption is the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution.17 The Supreme Court recognizes two types of 
preemption: express preemption and implied preemption.18	 Express 
preemption is when “Congress’ command [to preempt] is explicitly stated in 
the statute’s language,” and implied preemption is when it is “implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose.”19 
 
																																								 																				
To develop an acceptable SIP, each state first has to determine 
existing and projected levels of the criteria air pollutant in each [Air 
Quality Control Region] within the state’s boundaries. These data are 
used to determine what emissions reductions are necessary to comply 
with the NAAQS for the pollutant. The state must inventory sources of 
emissions and project their expected future growth. It then must confront 
the politically sensitive task of deciding what control strategies to employ 
and how to allocate the burden of emissions reductions among sources. 
Finally, the state must demonstrate to EPA that the measures adopted in 
its SIP are adequate to attain and maintain compliance with the NAAQS. 
16.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (d), (g)(1) (1994) (permitting for remedies of both injunction 
and punitive civil penalties, which are payable to the federal treasury). 
17.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
18.  E.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption 
may be either expressed or implied, and “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly 
stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
19.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
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A.  Express Preemption 
     Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states that federal 
law is the exclusive law and state law is to be disregarded.20 With regard to 
express preemption, courts employ textualism and concentrate on the plain 
meaning of the law.21 Courts may also consider relevant legislative history.22 
B.  Implied Preemption 
     Under implied preemption, the two main subcategories are field 
preemption and conflict preemption. Field preemption occurs when a federal 
regulatory regime is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”23 or when Congress 
“touches ‘a field in which [the] federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.’”24 With regard to field preemption, state laws do not have 
jurisdiction regardless of whether they conflict with federal law or frustrate 
any purpose of Congress.25 This Article discusses conflict preemption in the 
following section. 
III. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
A.  Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 
     There are two types of conflict preemption: impossibility preemption and 
obstacle preemption.26 Impossibility preemption occurs when a federal law 
																																								 																				
20.  N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 153 (1917). 
21.  S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
685, 700 (1991); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort 
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 566 (1997). 
22.  Grey, supra note 21. 
23.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L. J. 2085, 2105 (2000); 
Garrick B. Pursley, The Structure of Preemption Decisions, 85 NEB. L. REV. 912, 930 (2007). 
26.  In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig. (MTBE Prods. Liab.), 725 F.3d 65, 
97 (“The Supreme Court has adopted various formulations of the ‘impossibility’ branch of 
conflict preemption.”). See also English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (“Finally, state law 
is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found 
pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
requirements, see, e. g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 
(1963), or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
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and a state law are in tension, to the point that complying with one will 
necessitate violating the other.27 Impossibility preemption analysis focuses on 
whether the intent to preempt state law can be inferred from the direct 
conflict between state and federal law.28 Obstacle preemption occurs when a 
state law is preempted because it “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”29 Obstacle preemption analysis involves (i) examining the 
purposes and objectives of the federal law, and (ii) examining how the state 
law frustrates those purposes and objectives.30 In 1955, Congress passed the 
first legislation regarding air regulation, which is known as the Air Pollution 
Control Act of 1955 (the “1955 Act”).31 Tragic incidents involving air quality, 
both domestic and foreign, spurred Congress to act.32 
     With regard to the 1955 Act, Congress realized that understanding air 
quality and air pollution required a standard of scientific technicality and 
complexity.33 The legislative history distinctly notes that, before determining 
regulatory requirements, there was a “need to determine the causes of air 
pollution, the meteorological factors and chemical elements involved, the 
effects, and possible preventive measures.”34 Moreover, Congress understood 
																																								 																				
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See 
also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 747 (1981).”) (emphasis added). 
27.  Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 205 
(2000); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption may be 
either expressed or implied, and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated 
in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525)). 
28.  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
29.  Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
30.  Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 205–206. 
31.  Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.  
32.  S. REP. NO. 84-389, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2457, 2457–58 (Report 
of Committee on Public Works) (“While a few areas have attracted unusual attention because 
of air contamination[,] the problem is rapidly becoming serious and causing alarm in many 
places. Tragic results have followed unexplained occurrences of fumes, fog, and murkiness in 
the past, as in the Meuse Valley in Belgium, in London, in Donora, Pa., and in Poza Rica, 
Mexico, during present history. Considerable publicity has been given to ‘smog’ sieges in Los 
Angeles and public officials have indicated fear that like conditions may be developing in such 
widely separated cities as New York and Cleveland.”). 
33.  Id. at 5. 
34.  Id. at 1–2. 
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that, in order to pragmatically implement air regulation, coordination among 
various agencies was sine qua non.35  
     Congress knew that it had to find a way to legislate through a 
constitutional power.36 To satisfy this requirement, Congress employed the 
Commerce Clause and claimed that air pollution resulted in “injury to 
agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and deterioration of property, 
and hazards to air and ground transportation.”37 
     The 1955 Act was groundbreaking with regard to the powers it granted to 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary), as well as to the 
Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (Surgeon General).38 The 1955 
Act authorized the Surgeon General to: 
(1) [E]ncourage cooperative activities by State and local 
governments for the prevention and abatement of air pollution; 
(2) collect and disseminate information relating to air pollution and 
the prevention and abatement thereof; 
(3) conduct in the Public Health Service, and support and aid the 
conduct by State and local government air pollution control 
agencies, and other public and private agencies and institutions of, 
technical research to devise and develop methods of preventing and 
abating air pollution; and 
(4) make available to State and local government air pollution 
control agencies, other public and private agencies and institutions, 
and industries, the results of surveys, studies, investigations, 
research, and experiments relating to air pollution and the 
prevention and abatement thereof.39 
The 1955 Act also required the Surgeon General to occasionally publish 
reports of the “surveys, studies, investigations, research, and experiments 
made under the authority of this Act.”40 The “dangers to the public health 
																																								 																				
35.  Id. at 4 (“[T]he program which would be made possible by this legislation should 
stimulate State and local agencies as well as aid them in dealing with phases of the problem 
with which they are most immediately concerned. The problem of research into the causes 
and ultimate elimination of air pollution is so complex and vast that it is not realistic to expect 
a solution through uncoordinated efforts of a multitude of agencies.”). 
36.  Id. (“The bill does not propose any exercise of police power by the Federal 
Government and no provision in it invades the sovereignty of States, counties, or cities.”). 
37.  Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159 § 1, 69 Stat. 322. 
38.  § 1, 69 Stat. at 322. 
39.  § 2(b), 69 Stat. at 322. 
40.  § 4, 69 Stat. at 322. 
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and welfare” phrasing is what would ultimately shape how Congress 
addresses air regulation to the present day.41 This was a major shift from the 
previous approach to air pollution, which centered around the common law, 
specifically torts and negligence claims.42 
B. Clean Air Act 
     In response to a message to Congress by President John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy in February 1963,43 Congress passed the “Clean Air Act” (the “1963 
Act”) in December 196344 with the intent to replace the 1955 Act.45 Consistent 
with the purposes stated by President Kennedy, Congress stated the purposes 
of the legislation were to:  
(1) protect the Nation’s air resources . . . ; 
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development 
program . . . ; 
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local 
governments in connection with . . . air pollution prevention and 
control programs; and 
(4) to encourage . . . regional air pollution control programs.46 
The 1963 Act further mandates that the Secretary establish a national air 
pollution control program.47 Establishing a national program illustrates the 
intent of Congress to occupy the field.48 Congress may delegate the power of 
																																								 																				
41.  § 1, 69 Stat. at 322. 
42.  VICTOR SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 531 (11th ed. 2005) 
(“Proof of damages is an important part of plaintiff’s cause of action, whether based on 
intentional conduct, negligence, or strict liability.”). 
43.  Press Release, John F. Kennedy, Special Message on Improving American Health (Feb. 
7, 1963) (available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/052/JFKPOF-
052-013). 
44.  Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 14, 77 Stat. 392, 401 (1963).  
45.  H.R. REP. NO. 88-508, at 4 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1260, 1262 (“This 
legislation would replace the Air Pollution Control Act (act of July 14, 1955, Public Law 159, 
84th Cong., as amended) with a new version, a ‘Clean Air Act.’ The new act constitutes a 
complete revision of existing law by strengthening and making more explicit the authority of 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect to its activities in air pollution 
research, training, and demonstrations.”). 
46.  § 1(b), 77 Stat. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47.  § 3, 77 Stat. at 394–95 (Research, Investigations, Training, and Other Activities). 
48.  See, e.g., Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s 
Federal Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers: United States v. Scholnick, 606 
F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that “in any consideration of remedies available upon 
62 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
	
preemption to a federal agency by passing enabling legislation.49 
Additionally, part of this mandate entails that the Secretary provide financial 
assistance to state air pollution control agencies.50 The complexity of the 
CAA, combined with the financial investments it makes, strongly suggests 
that it intends to occupy the field, which is field preemption.51 Moreover, the 
CAA does not mandate that the state governments take action, but it does 
mandate that the federal government take several actions.52  
     The 1963 Act mandates that the Secretary research “the harmful effects on 
the health or welfare of persons by the various known air pollution agents (or 
combinations of agents).”53 The language of “health or welfare of any 
																																								 																				
default of a federally held or insured loan, federal interest predominates over state interest” 
because of “an overriding federal interest in protecting the funds of the United States and in 
securing federal investments”); United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 597–98 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(“The national loan program of the Veterans Administration cannot be subjected to the 
vagaries of the various state laws which might otherwise control all or some phases of the loan 
program.”). Banking/Debt Cancellation: Edwards v. Macys, No. 14 Civ. 8616 (CM), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31097 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Express preemption under Section 37; field preemption 
due to comprehensive regulatory scheme governing enrollment, eligibility, and fees.); Gordon 
v. Kohls Dept. Store, 172 F. Supp. 3d 840 (E.D Pa. 2016) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 37 (National banks 
debt cancellation contracts are governed by this part, and not by State law.)).  
49.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2012) (FCC preemption expressly delegated). 
50.  § 3(a)(2), (b)(3) 77 Stat. at 394. 
51.  John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1183, 1209–11 (1995). See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 81,746–47 (Dec. 12, 1980) (cutting off federal 
highway funds to California when the state failed to adopt federally approved inspection and 
maintenance programs for used cars). See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994) (the EPA defines the 
pollution standards for all of the other air pollution programs as well); id. § 7411 (new source 
performance standards); id. § 7412 (hazardous air pollutants); id. § 7470–7479 (setting the 
standards preventing significant deterioration in attainment areas). 
52.  H.R. REP. No. 88-508, at 9 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1260, 1267 (“The 
committee believes that the procedures provided constitute a reasonable balance between the 
primary rights of the States to control air pollution within their boundaries and the rights of 
States seriously affected by pollution from another State to have available to them a practical 
remedy.”). Also, a state or local government authority may make a request to the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (“Secretary”) regarding intrastate air pollution. The Secretary 
is then obligated to issue a notice of a conference, but only if there was “alleged air pollution 
which is endangering the health or welfare of persons” § 5(c)(1)(A)–(B), 77 Stat. at 396 
(whenever a state or local government made a request to the Secretary concerning “air 
pollution which is alleged to endanger the health or welfare of persons in a State other than 
that in which the discharge . . . originate[d],” the Secretary was required to issue a notice of a 
conference). This pairing of a mandatory obligation—the obligation to call a conference—with 
a discretionary determination—a determination that there is endangerment—was similar to 
the approach of requiring the Department to publish air quality criteria if it determined there 
was a particular air pollutant causing harmful effects on human health. 
53.  Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206 § 3(c)(1), 77 Stat. 392, 395 (1963) (emphasis added). 
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persons” is reflective of the common law concept of harm.54 This language of 
“health or welfare of any persons” would transform to “endangerment,” 
which is a statutory concept.55 
     Continuing from the 1955 Act, the 1963 Act further facilitated the 
transition from the common law approach of air pollution to a codified 
regulatory scheme.56 The 1963 Act maintains that air pollution, which 
“endangers the health, or welfare of any persons,” was subject to abatement.57 
Injunctions are a common-law remedy for private nuisance and public 
nuisance.58 
     The 1963 Act cemented congressional oversight on state laws with regard 
to air quality. Congress recognized that different sources, specifically 
urbanization, industrial development, and motor vehicles, are major sources 
																																								 																				
54.  See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 16, 20 (1970) (the terms “danger” and “endangerment” 
are used in terms such as “danger to public health or welfare” and “endangerment of public 
health and welfare”). Compare Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 
322 (“dangers to the public health and welfare”), with Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, 84 Stat. 1684 (1970) (requiring the EPA Administrator to publish a list of sources that 
“may contribute significantly to air pollution which causes or contributes to the endangerment 
of public health or welfare”), and id. at § 1685, 84 Stat. at 1676 (granting the EPA Administrator 
with the authority to grant a waiver of permit requirements for two years so long as the waiver 
is necessary to “assure that the health of persons will be protected from imminent 
endangerment”), and id. at § 1705, 84 Stat. at 1676 (granting the EPA Administrator authority 
to bring suit against a source that is “presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the health of persons”) (emphasis added). 
55.  Modern statutory language usually uses the term “endangers,” rather than 
“endangerment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2012) (necessitating Administrator 
publicizing each air pollutant, “emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”) 
(emphasis added); § 7521(a)(1) (requiring EPA to prescribe “standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor 
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”) (emphasis added). When the 
Congress wants to give rise to a common law remedy, such as abatement or another form of 
injunctive relief, it usually uses the term “endangerment,” see § 7412(r)(9)(A) (allowing the 
EPA to seek the relief of abatement of an accidental release of a regulated substance when it is 
“imminent and substantial endangerment to the human health or welfare or the 
environment”); § 7419(d)(1)(A)–(B)(ii) (authorizing the EPA to require actions by primary 
nonferrous smelters “to avoid an imminent and substantial endangerment to health of 
persons”); § 7603 (granting the EPA emergency powers to seek abatement of air pollution that 
“is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare, or the 
environment”). 
56.  See, e.g., § 5(b), 77 Stat. at 396; § 8(a), 77 Stat. at 400; § 10(a), 77 Stat. at 401.  
57.  § 5(a), 77 Stat. at 396.  
58.  DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 613 (6th ed. 2009). 
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of air pollution.59 Moreover, Congress acknowledged that some of these 
sources may travel across state lines.60 This complexity led Congress to the 
pragmatic reason that cooperation among the states is imperative to 
successfully implementing laws, but it still must maintain control. As such, 
the 1963 Act allows states to enter into interstate agreements that are subject 
to congressional approval.61 If Congress did not intend to preempt state tort 
law claims with regard to air, then it would not have stated that agreements 
amongst states are subject to congressional approval. 
C.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965 
     In 1965, Congress amended the 1963 Act to control the emission of motor 
vehicle pollutants, among other things (the “1965 Act”).62 Congress noted 
that California already had emissions requirements, and nevertheless sought 
to create a national standard and preempt state law.63 In response to President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson,64 a significant amendment of the 1965 Act is that it 
allows the Secretary to take action preemptively, rather than wait and take 
																																								 																				
59.  § 1(a)(2), 77 Stat. at 392–93 (“[T]he growth in the amount and complexity of air 
pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of 
motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare”) (emphasis 
added). 
60.  § 1(a)(1), 77 Stat. 392. 
61.  § 2(c), 77 Stat. at 393. 
62.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
63.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-899, at 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3608, 3611–12 (“The 
technical knowledge and skills needed to achieve a significant reduction in motor vehicle 
pollution are now available. The automobile industry has indicated that equipment has been 
developed for reducing tailpipe emissions, which account for the major share of motor vehicle 
pollution, and that this equipment will be supplied on cars for distribution in California 
beginning with the 1966 model year, in compliance with the laws of that State. Furthermore, 
in testimony before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare, representatives of the 
automobile manufacturers indicated that similar equipment could be supplied on all new cars 
manufactured in the United States by the 1968 model year, if such measures were mandatory 
under Federal law.”) (emphasis added). 
64.  Id. at 3621, 3623 (“We recommend an amendment to the Clean Air Act—not 
contained in any of the bills—to carry out the recommendation in the President’s message on 
natural beauty that the act ‘be improved to permit the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to investigate potential air pollution problems before pollution happens, rather than 
having to wait until the damage occurs, as is now the case, and to make recommendations 
leading to the prevention of such pollution.’” (quoting President Johnson)). 
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action retroactively to air pollution problems.65 This remedy applies to air 
pollution that “endanger[s] the health or welfare of any persons.”66  
     As part of the amendment, Congress created the Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act (the MVAPCA).67 It requires the Secretary to set 
automobile emissions standards that limit “air pollution which endangers the 
health or welfare of any persons.”68 The MVAPCA mandated that vehicles 
conform with regulations69 in order to be in the stream of commerce of the 
United States market.70 It is a requirement that the Secretary issue a certificate 
of conformity to confirm the vehicle complies with the MVAPCA.71 For those 
who violate the law, Congress authorizes the United States to pursue legal 
remedies by allowing suits to be in Federal District Court.72 Creating a 
uniform set of regulations for vehicles, issuing a certificate from the 
Secretary, and enacting enforcement provisions with federal legal remedies 
are all indicators that Congress intended to preempt state laws with regard to 
motor vehicle pollution control. 
     The 1965 Act also extended the abatement provisions to pollution 
“endangering to the health or welfare of persons” in a foreign country, 
provided that said foreign country gives reciprocity to the United States.73 
This beacons the doctrine of international comity, which is “the most 
appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the 
obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.”74 In 
																																								 																				
65.  §§ 209(b), 103(e), 79 Stat. at 995–96 (“If, in the judgment of the Secretary, an air 
pollution problem of substantial significance may result from discharge or discharges into the 
atmosphere, he may call conference concerning this potential air pollution problem to be held 
in or near one or more of the places where such discharge or discharges are occurring or will 
occur.”). 
66.  §§ 209(b), 102(f)(1), 79 Stat. at 995–96.  
67.  § 201, 79 Stat. at 992.  
68.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272 § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992, 992–
93 (“The Secretary shall by regulation, giving appropriate consideration to technological 
feasibility and economic costs, prescribe as soon as practicable standards, applicable to the 
emission of any kind of substance, from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new 
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause or contribute to, or are likely to cause or 
to contribute to, air pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons, and such 
standards shall apply to such vehicles or engines whether they are designed as complete 
systems or incorporate other devices to prevent or control such pollution.”). 
69.  § 203(a)(1), 79 Stat. at 993. 
70.  Id.  
71.  § 206, 79 Stat. at 994.  
72.  § 204, 79 Stat. at 994. 
73.  § 209, § 102(c)(D)–(f)(1), 79 Stat. at 995–96.   
74.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS  41 (2nd ed. 2003). 
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two cases before the Supreme Court,75 the Court asserts that there is a 
constitutional argument for a “self-executing exclusion of state authority” 
from foreign affairs.76 Even assuming arguendo that this argument is not 
considered, the United States cannot reasonably expect a foreign country to 
give reciprocity to a patchwork of state laws, some of which conflict with 
United States federal law.77 Thus, if state common law claims are not 
preempted, it would render this provision of the CAA superfluous, which 
violates the Rule Against Surplusage.78   
D.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1967 
     In 1967, Congress amended the 1963 Act (the 1967 Act).79 Congress 
emphasized the blurred jurisdictional lines concerning air pollution and held 
																																								 																				
75.  Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398 (1964). 
76.  Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1617, 1630 (1997). 
77.  ADEQ Moving Forward with New Air Testing Law Despite Concerns, ARK. NEWS 
BUREAU (June 10, 2013), https://www.arkansasnews.com/article/20130610/NEWS/306109876 
(“Thomas Diggs, associate director for air in EPA’s Region 6 office in Dallas, wrote in a June 
5 letter to Mike Ross, chief of ADEQ’s air division, that Act 1302 ‘will affect ADEQ’s current 
air permit program and we would like to remind the ADEQ and its legal obligations under the 
Clean Air Act and the Arkansas State Implementation Plan to protect human health and the 
environment.’”). 
78.  Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoted in Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 
303, 314 (2009)); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (interpreting word 
“law” broadly could render word “regulation” superfluous in preemption clause applicable to 
a state “law or regulation”; statutes should be construed so as to avoid rendering superfluous 
any statutory language); Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 
(1991); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (Courts should “give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies 
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”). See also Bailey 
v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms because 
it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”) (rejecting interpretation 
that would have made “uses” and “carries” redundant in statute penalizing using or carrying 
a firearm in commission of offense). In a case analyzing the significance of the adjective 
“applicable” in a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the majority opinion relied on the 
presumption again superfluity to hold that “applicable” had a limiting effect, whereas Justice 
Scalia, in dissent, observed that “[t]he canon against superfluity is not a canon against 
verbosity. When a thought could have been expressed more concisely, one does not always 
have to cast about for some additional meaning to the word or phrase that could have been 
dispensed with.” Compare Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., 562 U.S. 61, 69–74 (2011) and Ransom 
v. FIA Card Servs., 562 U.S. at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79.  Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (Stating its purpose is “[t]o 
amend the Clean Air Act to authorize planning grants to air pollution control agencies; expand 
research provisions relating to fuels and vehicles; provide for interstate air pollution control 
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that state lines are no longer the best approach to determine boundaries.80 
     Continuing with the theme of preempting state law, the 1967 Act 
mandates that the Secretary set “jurisdictional boundaries, urban-industrial 
concentrations, and other factors including atmospheric areas necessary to 
provide adequate implementation of air quality standards.”81 This may be 
interpreted as Congress knew that it needed to set air quality standards to 
cover multiple states. If this were not the case, Congress would have simply 
used state boundaries instead of “jurisdictional boundaries.”82 If air pollution 
control laws are not preempted, significant argument will arise over the 
applicable state law when air pollution crosses state boundary lines. This will 
likely open the floodgates to civil lawsuits over damages and costs. 
     The 1967 Act also states that the Secretary can issue air quality criteria 
concerning public health and welfare to the states.83 The criteria may include 
factors that may permute the effects on public health or welfare, in addition 
to agents that may interact with other agents and result in an unpropitious 
effect on public health or welfare.84 Additionally, the 1967 Act85 amendment 
furthered the provision of the 1963 Act mandate that decreed air pollution, 
“which endangers the health or welfare of any persons,” was subject to 
abatement.86 The 1967 Act provides that an air quality standard program 
needs to be established.87 If the air quality standards are violated, there is an 
enforcement provision that allows the Secretary to use abatement, similar to 
previous iterations of the CAA.88 
																																								 																				
agencies or commissions; authorize the establishment of air quality standards, and for other 
purposes.”).  
80.  § 107(a)(2), 81 Stat. at 490–91. 
81.  Id. 
82.  H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 10 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1938, 1945 (Report 
of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) (“Such regions could include parts of two 
or more States or could lie entirely within a single State. In either case, each one would include 
a group of communities affected by a common air pollution problem.”). 
83.  § 107(b)(1), 81 Stat. 485, 491 (“[S]uch criteria of air quality as in his judgment may be 
requisite for the protection of the public health and welfare.”). 
84.  § 107(b)(3), 81 Stat. 485, 491 (“Such criteria shall include those variable factors which 
of themselves or in combination with other factors may alter the effects on public health and 
welfare of any subject agent or combination of agents, including, but not limited to, 
atmospheric conditions, and the types of air pollution agent or agents which, when present in 
the atmosphere, may interact with such subject agent or agents, to produce an adverse effect 
on public health and welfare.”). 
85.  § 108, 81 Stat. 485, 491–97 (Air Quality Standards and Abatement of Air Pollution). 
86.  § 108(a), 81 Stat. 485, 491. 
87.  § 108(b)–(c)(1), 81 Stat. 485, 491–92. 
88.  See, e.g., § 108(c)(4) 81 Stat. 485, 493; § 108(d)–(h), 81 Stat. 485, 494–96.  
68 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
	
     Congress allowed states to have the first opportunity to set their respective 
air quality standards.89 However, a recipient of delegated Congressional 
authority would have the final say and hold ultimate approval.90 Congress 
was cognizant of the scenario of transporting air pollution from one state to 
another.91 Notwithstanding, Congress was aware that if it did not hold final 
approval, states may set forth their own air quality standards that would be 
in tension with the standards of other states, which would create (or make) 
toothless regulations or open a floodgate of litigation with states suing each 
other.92 
E. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 
     In 1970, Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (1970 
Act).93 Earlier in the year, President Richard Milhous Nixon created the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA usurped powers from the 
Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health, Interior, and Welfare.94 The 
purpose was to strengthen environmental laws by enabling enforcement to 
be taken without being impeded by bureaucracy at the aforementioned 
agencies.95 
     The 1970 Act shifted authority from the states to the federal government 
in several sections. Sections 108 and 109 of the 1970 Act granted exclusive 
authority to the EPA to develop air quality standards, and thus repealed the 
provision of the 1967 Act that gave states the first opportunity to do so.96 
																																								 																				
89.  H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 1939. 
90.  Id. at 1946–47 (“In all cases, the standards and plans for implementation would be 
submitted to the Department for evaluation.”). 
91.  Id. at 1952 (“The provisions relating to the adoption of air quality standards are the 
heart of the legislation.”) (Congress was aware that there may be concern that some states may 
implement inadequate standards and plans for implementations, and thus place an undue 
burden on other states. Id. at 1945. Some pollutants escape state borders, and degrade the air 
quality of other states and do not provide any sort of benefit. EPA v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 495 (2014). Thus, while states were given the first opportunity 
to set their respective air quality standards, Congress retained power of oversight to ensure 
fairness and practicality.). 
92.  Id. at 1953 (“Where a designated air quality control region includes portions of two 
or more States, the possibility exists that the respective States may adopt differing standards of 
air quality. It is the committee’s view that no State should be permitted to set air quality 
standards which, even if fully implemented, would impair air quality in any portion of another 
State below the standards set by that other State.”). 
93.  Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. 
94.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623–25 (Oct. 6, 1970), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C. app. at 208 (2012). 
95.  § 1, 84 Stat. 1676, 1676. 
96.  Sec. 4(a), § 108(a)–(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–80; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7410.  
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Section 108 mandated that the EPA Administrator promulgated all 
pollutants that “in his judgment ha[ve] an adverse effect on public health or 
welfare[,] the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or 
diverse mobile or stationary sources.”97 Section 109 required the EPA to 
promulgate air quality standards for air pollutants recognized under Section 
108.98 Thus, Congress abolished the right of states to establish air quality 
standards and bestowed this right to the EPA.99 
     Section 111 granted power to the EPA to set standards for individual 
sectors.100 Under this power, the EPA sets emission standards for individual 
facilities, based upon each sector.101 Section 112 authorized the EPA to enact 
regulations regarding “hazardous air pollutants.”102 These shifts of authority 
signify the intent of Congress to have federal law be the source of air pollution 
control and strip away the authority of the states concerning this matter.103 
     Throughout the history of the CAA, Congress has continually and 
consistently shifted rights from the states to the federal government. The 
basis of the CAA is the EPA’s desire for a national standard in air quality.104 
The EPA has unrestricted power when determining the appropriate level of 
regulation, which is statutorily defined as “the attainment and maintenance 
of which in the judgment of the Administrator . . . are requisite to protect the 
public health.”105 This is a clear indication that Congress intends for the CAA 
to preempt state common law claims. 
																																								 																				
97.  Sec. 4(a), § 108(a)(1)(A)–(B), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678. 
98.  § 109(a)(2)–(b), 84 Stat. 1676, 1679–80. 
99.  §§ 108(a)–(b), 109, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–80. 
100.  § 111, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683–84. 
101.  E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.40 (2013) (Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Steam 
Generators); 40 C.F.R. § 60.90 (2013) (Standards of Performance for Hot Mix Asphalt Plants); 
40 C.F.R. § 60.100 (2013) (Standards of Performance for Petroleum Refineries). 
102.  Sec. 4(a), § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (defining a “hazardous air pollutant” as an air 
pollutant that “may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness”). Compare sec. 4(a), § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 
with § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678–79 (discussing a “criteria pollutant” which merely must have 
an “adverse effect on public health or welfare”).  
103.  See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, Title I, 81 Stat. 485, 485–99 
(modeling this after an approach to stationary sources that acknowledges that states have 
primary authority). 
104.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1970). 
105.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1678 (referencing the statute which requires the EPA 
Administrator to “in his judgment ha[ve] an adverse effect on public health or welfare[,] the 
presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary 
sources . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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IV. CONTRASTING THE CLEAN AIR ACT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
     One federal district court laid down the challenge and stated that if 
preemption does exist in the CAA, it must be found on its own accord.106 We 
begin by looking at the language of the CAA.107 In Jackson v. General Motors 
Corp., a federal district court held that Section 209(a) of the CAA preempts 
state common law claims.108 In Jackson, current and former New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority workers alleged state common law 
tort claims for exposure to diesel particulates and fumes.109 When analyzing 
Section 209(a), the court noted that the key phrase “[n]o State . . . shall adopt 
or attempt to enforce” means that state tort law claims premised upon 
emission standards are preempted.110 Therefore, the court concluded that the 
CAA preempts state tort law claims premised upon emissions standards.111 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) contains language, which the CAA does not 
contain, that enables states to impose stricter standards.112 The 
aforementioned language is “with respect to the waters (including boundary 
waters) of such Stat[es].”113 The Court in Ouellette indicated that most state 
standards were preempted, and that the only standards permitted were those 
regulating water discharges solely within the state.114 Correspondingly, since 
the CAA does not allow states to impose stricter standards, it may be inferred 
that the CAA does preempt state common law claims. Moreover, if the 
reasoning in Ouellette were applied to the CAA, there would be a greater 
likelihood of conflict between state and federal law.115 The Ouellette Court 
was concerned “over [a significant] policy issue–[whether] the imposition of 
																																								 																				
106.  United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D.N.J. 1982). 
107.  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“Our first step in interpreting a 
statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning 
with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory 
language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” (quoting 
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989))). 
108.  Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F. Supp. 2d 570, 572–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
109.  Id. at 572. 
110.  Id. at 573–74. 
111.  Id. at 577. 
112.  33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Section 510(1) of the statute explicitly preserves the right for state 
authority to regulate water pollution so long as state standards are at least as stringent as the 
federal standards they are supplanting.). 
113.  Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987); see also Jason J. Heinen, Note, 
How the Constitution Draws a “Line in the Sand” for the Extent of Federal Control over Non-
Navigable Waterways, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 115 (2010) (discussing how the federal government 
is increasing its oversight over water through environmental regulation). 
114.  Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493.  
115.  Id. at 498–500.  
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one state’s liability law on an out-of-state source might trammel with the 
policy choices made in said out-of-state’s implementation plan.”116 
     In American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut,117 the Supreme Court 
blazoned that the CAA preempts federal common law claims.118 Justice Alito, 
joined by Justice Thomas, wrote that the preemption of federal common law, 
in this case, is premised upon “the interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act . . . adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA.”119 In Massachusetts, 
the Court delivered a 5–4 decision that the EPA does have authority under 
the CAA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles, but 
the Court disavowed that it was directing the EPA as to if and how it must 
regulate such emissions.120 The CAA maintains that the EPA Administrator 
has the authority to set the standards for “any air pollutant from . . . motor 
vehicles which in his judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”121 In American Electric Power Company, Justice Ginsburg explained, 
“The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether 
and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the 
delegation is what displaces federal common law.”122 Justice Ginsburg further 
elaborated that if the EPA passed inadequate regulations, or even went so far 
as to “decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions altogether,” it would be 
inconsequential to the preempting of federal common law.123 Furthermore, 
the Court opined that even if the CWA imposes a more comprehensive 
																																								 																				
116.  See, e.g., Debra G. Archer, Controlling Acid Rain: The Clean Air Act and Federal 
Common Law Nuisance, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 1135 (1982); James M. Fischer, The Availability of 
Private Remedies for Acid Rain Damage, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429 (1981). 
117.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
118.  While the Supreme Court once proclaimed, “There is no federal general common 
law,” (Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)), it later reversed course and held that 
there is federal common law when it is necessary “to effectuate congressional policy” (United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979)), or “to protect . . . federal interests.” Id. 
at 718. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (“When we deal with air 
and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
119.  Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
120.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–35 (2007). 
121.  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2017) (emphasis added). 
122.  Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426.  
123.  Id. (“As Milwaukee II made clear, however, the relevant question for purposes of 
displacement is ‘whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a 
particular manner.’” (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981))). 
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system of regulations than the CAA, it is irrelevant in determining if the CAA 
preempts state common law claims.124 
     The CAA operates on a “cooperative federalism framework,”125 whereas 
the CWA does not.126 The primary purpose of the CAA is to set air quality 
standards “so as to promote the public health and welfare.”127 To fulfill this 
purpose, the EPA Administrator is required to establish NAAQS for any 
pollutants that pose a threat to the public’s health or welfare.128 Additionally, 
each state has to submit a SIP, which regulates stationary sources.129 
However, the SIP is subject to the approval of the EPA Administrator.130 
Upon approval, the SIP is enforceable as both state and federal law.131 While 
the interplay between state and federal law can get complex,132 there is a 
bright line with regard to the CWA. The CWA does not require states to 
submit plans for implementation. Since the EPA Administrator has to 
approve the plans of the states, the federal government is essentially dictating 
the state standards. As such, it logically follows that if the federal government 
is dictating standards at the state level, it would preempt state common law 
claims. 
     The CAA is not as ubiquitous as the CWA. The CAA regulates stationary 
sources that are dangerous to public health and welfare, but it does not 
																																								 																				
124.  Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426 (“Of necessity, Congress selects different 
regulatory regimes to address different problems. Congress could hardly preemptively 
prohibit every discharge of carbon dioxide unless covered by a permit. After all, we each emit 
carbon dioxide merely by breathing. The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the legislature’s 
‘considered judgment’ concerning the regulation of air pollution because it permits 
emissions until [the] EPA acts.”). 
125.  See generally Holly Doermus & W. Michael Doremus, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why 
the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global 
Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008). 
126.  Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992). The Court explains that the Clean 
Water Act “effectively incorporate[s]” state law into the federal regulatory scheme. In certain 
instances, this turns state law into federal law. 
127.  42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2019). 
128.  Id. § 7409. 
129.  Id. § 7410(a)(1). 
130.  Id. § 7410(a)(2). 
131.  See id. § 7413(a). 
132.  See Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 289 (4th Cir. 2001) (The Surface Mining 
Control Act employed a cooperative federalism strategy under which “after a State enacts 
statutes and regulations that are approved by the Secretary, these statutes and regulations 
become operative, and the federal law and regulations [that set forth the basic policy goals], 
while continuing to provide the ‘blueprint’ against which to evaluate the State’s program, ‘drop 
out’ as operative provisions.”). 
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regulate all stationary sources of pollution.133 More specifically, the National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) or NAAQS 
under the CAA regulates the pollutants that are deemed “hazardous.”134 
Thus, stationary sources that emit pollutants but have not been deemed 
hazardous by either NESHAP or NAAQS are unregulated. There is a solid 
legal argument that pollutants not regulated by the CAA are not subject to 
preemption. An example is acid rain. Acid rain is created from sulfur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxide reacting in the atmosphere with water and oxygen.135 Acid 
deposition is not covered by the interstate pollution provision of the CAA 
and is thus unregulated by the CAA.136 Therefore, since there is no federal 
law on acid rain, it may be argued that state law on acid rain is not preempted. 
Nevertheless, since there is federal law on certain pollutants, this syllogism 
may lead one to determine that the CAA does preempt state common law 
claims over pollutants that the CAA regulates.   
V. COURTS WHICH ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT  
THE CLEAN AIR ACT PREEMPTS STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS 
A.  Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
1. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
     In North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found it difficult to balance the 
powers and authority of a federal regulatory scheme and the ability of states 
to protect their citizens through common law.137 When exploring the CAA, 
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that there is congressional intent to have 
emissions standards set by expert regulatory agencies, not courts.138 The 
																																								 																				
133.  42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2019). 
134.  See id. § 7412. 
135.  NAT’L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ACID 
PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM REPORT TO CONGRESS 2011: AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT 
(2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2011_napap 
_508.pdf. 
136.  Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 170 (1985). 
137.  N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Indeed, 
the district court properly recognized that ‘[t]he ancient common law of public nuisance is not 
ordinarily the means by which such major conflicts among governmental entities are resolved 
in modern American governance.’” (alteration in original) (quoting North Carolina v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (W.D.N.C. 2009))). 
138.  Id. at 299–300, 310. 
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court found the CAA directs the EPA to develop scientific expertise;139 then 
allows for notice and comment rulemaking;140 then facilitates uniform 
application of the standards.141 Thus, these factors culminate in preventing 
conflicting emissions standards.142 
     The Tennessee Valley Authority court acknowledged that all nuisance 
claims are not preempted.143 The court did elucidate claims should not be 
allowed to be brought under emission standards which are different from 
federal law and state law.144 The court held that North Carolina was not 
allowed to apply its common law to facilities in Alabama and Tennessee, and 
thus, “the law of the states where emissions sources are located . . . applies in 
an interstate nuisance dispute.”145 This holding is consistent with Bell v. 
Cheswick Generating Station (Bell II) and leaves open the possibility for a 
																																								 																				
139.  Id. at 304 (“Indeed, the Act directs the EPA to ensure that its air quality standards 
‘accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all 
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of 
such pollutant in the ambient air.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2017))). 
140.  Id. at 305 (“The required notice and comment periods detailed above are further 
designed to allow EPA and state regulators to receive broad inputs into the regulatory scheme. 
Agency rulemaking is a ‘quasi-legislative power, . . . intended to add substance to the Acts of 
Congress, to complete absent but necessary details, and to resolve unexpected problems.’” 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
141.  Id. at 305 (“Shapiro also observed that the general nature of rulemaking enables 
uniform application across industries, lessens the likelihood of distortions caused by the 
influence of individualized facts in cases, and also makes the resulting rules readily accessible 
in a single location.” (citing David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in 
the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 935–41 (1965))). 
142.  Id. at 302 (“The contrast between the defined standards of the Clean Air Act and an 
ill-defined omnibus tort of last resort could not be more stark. We are hardly at liberty to 
ignore the Supreme Court’s concerns and the practical effects of having multiple and 
conflicting standards to guide emissions. These difficulties are heightened if we allow multiple 
courts in different states to determine whether a single source constitutes a nuisance.”). 
143. N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2010) (“We 
need not hold flatly that Congress has entirely preempted the field of emissions regulation.” 
(citations omitted)). 
144.  Id. (“The Ouellette Court itself explicitly refrained from categorically preempting 
every nuisance action brought under source state law. 479 U.S. at 497–99. At the same time, 
however, the Ouellette Court was emphatic that a state law is preempted ‘if it interferes with 
the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach [its] goal,’ id. at 494, 
admonished against the ‘tolerat[ion]’ of ‘common-law suits that have the potential to 
undermine [the] regulatory structure,’ id. at 497, and singled out nuisance standards in 
particular as ‘vague’ and ‘indeterminate,’ id. at 496  (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 
U.S. 304, 317 (1981))”). 
145.  Cooper, 615 F.3d at 306. 
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state to bring forth state common law claims which are not preempted by the 
CAA.146 
2.  United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
     The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi and held 
that the CAA preempts state common law claims of negligence and public 
and private nuisance.147 In Comer, the plaintiffs brought tort claims alleging 
that major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters caused global warming, which 
then created Hurricane Katrina, which damaged their property.148  
     The Comer court noted that the CAA preempts judicial determinations of 
what reasonable GHG emissions levels are since “those determinations had 
been entrusted by Congress to the EPA [through the CAA].”149 The Supreme 
Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that federal judges were not 
allowed to determine what “amount of carbon-dioxide emissions is 
‘unreasonable,’” and then decide “what level of reduction is ‘practical, feasible 
and economically viable.’”150 Moreover, if courts were to set emission 
standards, they would be infringing on the powers of the Legislative Branch 
as they would essentially be making law.151 
B.  Federal District Courts 
1.  United States District Court for the Western District of   
Pennsylvania 
     In United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P. (EME Homer City 
Generation), the court held that the CAA preempts state common law public 
																																								 																				
146.  See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station (Bell II), 734 F.3d 188, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2013). 
147.  Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 718 
F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013). 
148.  Id. at 852. 
149.  Id. at 865. 
150.  Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011) (citations omitted). 
151.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (“To permit the execution of the laws to 
be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in 
Congress control over the execution of the laws.”). By this same logic, vesting powers to the 
Executive Branch, in this instance the DOJ, would reserve the right to the DOJ to make laws 
since they are determining what is constitutional and what is not constitutional. See also Max 
Birmingham, Lie to Me: Examining Specific Intent Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1035, 15 FLA. A&M 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the separation of powers between the branches of 
government, and the slippery slope of one branch trying to exert influence over another 
branch.). 
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nuisance claims.152 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants operated a plant 
without a permit, which violated the Pennsylvania Air Pollution and Control 
Act (APCA), the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan (SIP), and 
common law public nuisance.153 The court held that these claims “essentially 
track the federal claims” and that “[i]n effect, the state and federal 
enforcement efforts [pursuant to the APCA and the CAA] are parallel.”154 
     The EME Homer City Generation court blazoned that a plain meaning 
interpretation of the CAA stated that state common law public nuisance 
claims are preempted.155 Extending the reasoning under American Electric 
Power to preempt state common law claims, the court noted that “the Clean 
Air Act preempted federal common law nuisance claims . . . but did not rule 
on the availability of a state law nuisance claim. . . . [T]he issue would turn 
‘on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.’”156 The court exclaimed that a 
plain language interpretation of the CAA preempted public law nuisance 
claims because said claims are duplicative of the CAA.157 
VI. COURTS WHICH REJECT THE ARGUMENT THAT  
THE CLEAN AIR ACT PREEMPTS STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS 
A.  Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
1.  United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
     In In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Products Liability Litigation (MTBE 
Prods. Liab.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether the CAA has conflict preemption over state 
tort claims.158 Of significant note, however, is that the Second Circuit 
observed that the defendant, Exxon, did not argue that Congress intended to 
occupy the field with regard to the CAA.159 The Second Circuit could have 
																																								 																				
152.  United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 297 (W.D. 
Pa. 2011), aff’d on other grounds in part, 727 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2013). 
153.  EME Homer City, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 294. 
154.  Id.  
155.  See id. at 278 (“The role of the courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to 
Congress’s intent. . . . Because it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent through the 
ordinary meaning of its language, every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an 
examination of the plain language of the statute. When the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the test is not absurd—is [sic] 
to enforce it according to its terms.” (quoting Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 
759 (3d Cir. 2009))). 
156.  Id. at 296 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011)). 
157.  Id. at 296–97. 
158.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 96–98 (2d Cir. 2013). 
159.  Id. at 97.  
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considered this issue sua sponte but declined to do so.160 As such, the Second 
Circuit did not address this issue.161 
     The Second Circuit contended that the CAA was not in conflict 
preemption with state laws, yet it provided reasoning that is not pragmatic. 
Conflict preemption only exists if there is an actual conflict.162 Hypothetical, 
potential, or theoretical conflict is not sufficient to meet the threshold of 
conflict preemption.163 In MTBE Prods. Liab., Exxon used a gasoline additive 
in New York until there was a state ban.164 Exxon argued that Methyl Tertiary 
Butyl Ether (MTBE) is required under state law, even though state law did 
not explicitly or implicitly require this.165 John Cahill, the then-
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (NYSDEC) explained, “We still don’t have a good alternative 
to MTBE, so while we take a hard look at what other alternatives may be out 
there, we believe it’s appropriate to move forward and tighten up the 
																																								 																				
160.  Allan D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 
477 (1958). 
161.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 97 (“The parties agree that the Clean Air Act and its 
1990 Amendments contain no explicit preemption directive expressing a congressional intent 
to override state tort law, and Exxon does not argue that Congress intended to occupy any 
field relevant here. Rather, Exxon relies on the third form of preemption analysis—conflict 
preemption—to sustain its preemption argument. Accordingly, we address the two branches 
of conflict preemption in turn.”). See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 (1938) 
(Butler, J., dissenting) (“No constitutional question was suggested or argued below or here. 
And as a general rule, this Court will not consider any question not raised below and presented 
by the petition. Here it does not decide either of the questions presented but, changing the rule 
of decision in force since the foundation of the Government, remands the case to be adjudged 
according to a standard never before deemed permissible.” (citations omitted)); Morehead v. 
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 604–05 (1936) (“No application has been made for 
reconsideration of the constitutional question there decided. . . . [the State of New York] is not 
entitled and does not ask to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins case should be 
overruled.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 
(7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); Esselstyn v. 
Casteel, 288 P.2d 214, 214 (Or. 1955) (“The court can only decide questions that are before 
it.”). 
162.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990). 
163.  Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982). 
164.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2013). See Raymond Hernandez, Pataki 
Signs Two Measures Aimed at Cutting Back Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/nyregion/pataki-signs-two-measures-aimed-at-
cutting-back-pollution.html. 
165.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 98. 
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standards.”166 It is evident that ethanol is not necessarily an acceptable 
alternative to MTBE. 
     The Second Circuit acknowledged that enormous costs might meet the 
threshold of conflict preemption.167 The court observed that using ethanol in 
lieu of MTBE would increase the cost of manufacturing from 1.9 cents per 
gallon to 6.2 cents per gallon.168 Astonishingly, the court did not seem to 
understand the context of this cost.169 Exxon’s profit was approximately 7.0 
or 8.0 cents per gallon.170 If we take the low-end projection of the cost of 
manufacturing at approximately 2.0 cents and the high-end projection of 
profit margin at 8.0 cents, the enormous costs of threshold conflict would be 
met, as compliance would cost 25% of the profit margin. Using the most 
advantageous projections for Exxon, ethanol would cost 88.5% of the profit 
margin (the cost of manufacturing at 6.2 cents per gallon at a profit margin 
of 7.0 cents per gallon). Using either projection, the enormous cost makes 
compliance with the New York state law impossible.171 
     The Second Circuit conflated impossibility preemption with obstacle 
preemption. First, the court trivialized obstacle preemption by claiming that 
it was a subset of impossibility preemption.172 Then, the court held that 
“federal law does not preempt state law under obstacle preemption analysis 
																																								 																				
166.  Dan Fagin, Tougher Gas-Additive Rule, State to Lower Amount of Permissible MTBE, 
NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 1999, at A05. 
167.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 101 (“One can imagine a case in which a state law 
imposes such enormous costs on a party that compliance with a related federal mandate is 
effectively impossible. But this is not such a case.”). 
168.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 100–101 (2d Cir. 2013). 
169.  Id. at 101 (“At most, the evidence adduced at trial showed that using ethanol instead 
of MTBE would have increased Exxon’s production costs to an extent that was far from 
prohibitive. Exxon has not shown that economic and logistical hurdles rendered compliance 
with the federal mandate by using ethanol instead of MTBE impossible for the purposes of 
preemption analysis.” (footnote omitted)).  
170.  Kevin D. Williamson, The Facts About Gas Prices and Oil Profits, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 8, 
2013, 5:28 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/exchequer/facts-about-gas-prices-and-oil-
profits-kevin-d-williamson/ (“Exxon’s ‘downstream’ earnings—the money it makes selling 
gasoline and other refined petroleum products—run about 7 or 8 cents a gallon.”); Robert L. 
Bradley, Jr., Oil Company Earnings: Reality over Rhetoric, FORBES (May 10, 2011, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2011/05/10/oil-company-earnings.html#72944e522dc8 (“At the gas 
tank integrated oil companies make about 7 cents per gallon.”). 
171.  See MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 101; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 
287 (1995); Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 205–06.  
172.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 101 (“Obstacle analysis—which appears to us only an 
intermediate step down the road to impossibility preemption—precludes state law that poses an 
‘actual conflict’ with the overriding federal purpose and objective.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 162 (2d Cir. 2013))). 
2020] UP IN THE AIR  79 
	
 
	
unless ‘the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts 
cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.’”173 This is not obstacle 
preemption. Obstacle preemption, as the Supreme Court explained, 
“[F]rustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume 
that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”174 
This means that courts are to look at the purpose of the federal law and the 
legislative intent.175  
     It is clear from the legislative history of the CAA that its purpose and 
objective is to preempt state law. Even if there is specific legislative history 
declaring preemption, purposivists may broaden their interpretation of the 
statute by examining the policy context, in order to expand the ambit of what 
is presumed that legislators would envisage.176 With regard to the CAA, it is 
built on a model of “cooperative federalism.”177  Through cooperative 
federalism, the CAA allows the EPA to set standards for air emissions, which 
states are charged with implementing and enforcing.178 Furthermore, the Act 
allows the federal government to financially penalize states for failing to meet 
federal ambient air quality standards.179 The CAA does not allow states to 
penalize the federal government. “The [CAA] is the nation’s most far-
reaching federal environmental law.”180 Even with its far-reach, the Supreme 
Court has held that the CAA is constitutional.181 Additionally, the evolution 
																																								 																				
173.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 102 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Madeira v. Affordable 
Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
174.  Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (emphasis 
omitted). 
175.  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 266 
(2002); Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. 
REV. 370, 370–71 (1947); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 673, 677 & n.11 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should 
Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 252–53 (1998).  
176.  Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189–90 (N.Y. 1889) (admitting that the legislature 
intended to give effect to the testator’s wishes but presumed that the legislative would not have 
desired for a murderer to profit from their crime). 
177.  Cooperative federalism is defined as the “[d]istribution of power between the federal 
government and the states whereby each recognizes the powers of the other while jointly 
engaging in certain governmental functions.” Federalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (2017). 
178.  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (2017). 
179.  See id. § 7604 (permitting remedies of both injunction and punitive civil penalties, 
payable to the federal treasury).  
180.  Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? 
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 671, 672 (2016). 
181.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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of the legislative history of the CAA points to the federal government 
growing its authority to regulate air quality.182 In the 1970 amendments, 
Congress required the federal government to set air quality standards, even 
if state standards were sufficient. The states retained the task of implementing 
the air quality standards,183 but the federal government, specifically the EPA, 
was tasked with setting the air quality standards.184 
     The Second Circuit incorrectly performed preemption analysis in MTBE. 
First, the court looked at the nominal amount that compliance with the 
regulation would cost without considering the actual impact on the profit 
margin.185 Second, with regard to obstacle preemption, the court did not look 
at the legislative intent of Congress. Rather, the court employed a textualist 
approach to obstacle preemption, which Justice Thomas cheered on.186 
Despite the Second Circuit’s contention that obstacle preemption is when 
“the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot 
be reconciled or consistently stand together,”187 the Supreme Court has held 
that this is incorrect in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical 
Laboratories, Inc.188 In Hillsborough County, the Supreme Court announced 
that, while it may not literally be impossible to comply with both federal law 
and state law, federal law preempts state law when state law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”189 The Second Circuit failed to perform any analysis 
																																								 																				
182.  See infra § III. History of the Clean Air Act. This section details the five acts between 
1955 and 1970.  
183.  See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970). 
184.  See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–604, §§ 109, 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 
1679–80. 
185.  MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 100–101 (2d Cir. 2013) (the Second Circuit’s analysis 
is based on how much compliance costs per gallon on a nominal amount. The court does not 
mention how much profit the defendants made per gallon, nor what percentage of the profit 
margin compliance would cost.). 
186.  See Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling Extratextual Obstacle Preemption: 
Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 63, 68 
(2010). 
187.  See MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d at 102 (quoting Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., 
Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
188.  Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
189.  Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See also Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have 
recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of 
federal regulation is ‘“so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it,”’ and conflict pre-emption, where ‘compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’ or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle 
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of the purposes and objectives of Congress with regard to the CAA. If the 
court would have performed such analysis, it would have found that the CAA 
preempts state common law claims. If the court did not find impossibility 
preemption in the case, it should have found obstacle preemption.  
2.  United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
     In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station (Bell II),190 the Third Circuit 
reversed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania (Bell I)191 and erroneously held that the CAA does not preempt 
state common law claims based upon a comparison of the CWA. The Third 
Circuit focused its findings on congressional intent. The court reasoned that 
CAA allows states to impose stricter standards than the minimum federal 
requirements and the savings clause, which allows citizens to seek 
enforcement by bringing suit to enforce emission standards or limitations.192 
In Bell I, the district court articulated that the CAA “represents a 
comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme,” and the relief sought 
“impermissibly encroach[es] on and interfere[s] with that regulatory 
scheme.”193 The court then concluded that the CAA preempts state common 
law claims.194 
     In Bell II, the Third Circuit failed to perform an analysis of the CAA 
implicitly preempting state law. The Third Circuit’s opinion relied on the 
lack of explicit language in the CAA, stating that it preempts state law, and 
the court absurdly observed that the CAA is not comprehensive enough.195 
Further, the Third Circuit’s interpretation relied heavily on Ouellete, which 
is contrary to the federal district court’s holding.196 The CAA is considered 
one of the most comprehensive environmental statutes.197 Since the CAA is 
																																								 																				
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted)). 
190.  Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station (Bell II), 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013). 
191.  Bell v. Cheswick Generation Station (Bell I), 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 323 (W.D. Pa. 
2012). 
192.  Bell II, 734 F.3d at 191–97. See also Jonathan D. Sater, Note, Sackett v. EPA: The 
Murky Confluence of Due Process and Administrative Compliance Orders Under the Clean 
Water Act, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 329, 329–31 (2013) (noting that the reach of the Clean Water 
Act and other environmental regulations are growing to a point of arbitrariness). 
193.  Bell I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322. 
194.  Id. at 323. 
195.  Bell II, 734 F.3d at 191–97. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992). 
196.  Bell II, 734 F.3d at 194–95. 
197.  John Gibson, The Crime of “Knowing Endangerment” Under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990; Is It More “Bark Than Bite” as a Watchdog to Help Safeguard a 
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very comprehensive, there is a strong legal argument that it may be 
interpreted to preempt state law implicitly.198 
     When performing an implicit preemption analysis, it is circulus in 
demonstrando199 (circular reasoning) to look for explicit language for 
preemption and then hold that a lack of explicit language is evidence that 
there is no intent for implicit preemption.200 If there is explicit language in a 
statute for preemption, then there would be no need to perform an analysis 
of implicit preemption since the statute would clarify the issue of whether it 
intends to preempt. If Congress did not intend for the CAA to preempt state 
law, it would not have made the CAA as comprehensive as it is and empower 
the federal government to have oversight of state laws within the CAA under 
cooperative federalism. 
B.  Federal District Courts 
1.  United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas 
     In Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., the court incorrectly opined that the CAA 
does not preempt state law causes of action.201 The court misinterpreted 
preemption when it proclaimed that Congress does not intend for the CAA 
to preempt state common law claims because it would “preclude relief for any 
person who can prove the elements of the common law claims.”202 The court 
claimed Congress did not want the CAA to preempt state common law 
claims because it would effectively preempt state common law claims.203 If 
																																								 																				
Workplace Free from Life-Threatening Hazardous Air Pollutant Releases? 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 197 (1995); Roger Strelow, Reviewing the Clear Air Act, 4 ECOLOGY L. Q. 583, 587 
(1975); Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last visited Sept. 7, 2019). 
198.  Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (“[T]he scope of [federal law] 
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the field exclusively.”). See also Paul 
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2007). 
199.  DOUGLAS N. WALTON, PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT IN EVERYDAY 
CONVERSATION 206 (1992). “Wellington is in New Zealand. Therefore, Wellington is in New 
Zealand.” Id. 
200.  See Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (W.D. Tex. 1992); Robert 
N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 
727, 743 (2009) (“The requirement of ‘a specific statement of pre-emptive intent’ to 
demonstrate ‘an implicit intent’ to preempt in and of itself bespeaks some doctrinal disarray.” 
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). 
201.  Gutierrez, 798 F. Supp. at 1285.  
202.  Id. at 1284. 
203.  Id. (“To hold that the Clean Air Act preempts purely private state law causes of 
actions for damages would preclude relief for any person who can prove the elements of the 
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Congress did intend for the CAA to preempt state common law claims, it 
would preclude relief for any person who can prove the elements of the 
common law claims. Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning 
rule, which says that all other relevant information about statutory 
interpretation is not considered when the statutory text is plain or 
unambiguous.204 Second, the court does not point to the congressional record 
to support their notion that Congress does not intend for the CAA to 
preempt state common law claims. It is myopic as it completely overlooks the 
Supremacy Clause. When Congress underwent an expansion of its powers 
under the Commerce Clause, it brought a great number of state laws into 
conflict with federal laws.205 This led to the Supreme Court broadly 
interpreting congressional intent and often finding federal legislation to 
“occupy the field” and thus preempt state laws.206 Therefore, it is unfounded 
for the court to presume that Congress does not intend for the CAA to 
preempt state common law claims based on congressional intent.207 
     The Gutierrez court freely admitted that holding defendants liable under 
the CAA and state claims is worrisome.208 Notwithstanding this statement, 
the court based its interpretation on what it calls a plain interpretation of the 
statute without citing the specific language in the CAA to justify its claim.209 
																																								 																				
common law claims.” If the Clean Air Act preempts private state laws, it would obviously 
preclude persons from getting relief regardless of whether the elements of common law claims 
may be proved.). 
204.  Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990); David A. Strauss, Why Plain 
Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997). 
205.  Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 
967, 972–75 (2002) (discussing the Supremacy Clause and the expansion of preemption 
doctrine following “the unprecedented legislative activity of the post-Depression era”). 
206.  Id. at 974. 
207.  See supra Part III. 
208.  Gutierrez, 798 F. Supp. at 1285 (“This Court holds that the Clean Air Act does not 
preempt the plaintiffs’ various common law claims. Although this Court is concerned with the 
manageability and efficiency of this dual system that Congress has created, this Court must 
adhere to the language of the Act and the precedent established by the Supreme Court. Any 
change in the express wording of the statute must come from Congress and any change in the 
interpretation of such wording must come from a higher court. Such a conclusion is entirely 
consistent with the goals an [sic] purposes of the Clean Air Act, as well as the common law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
209.  Id. at 1285 (“This Court holds that the Clean Air Act does not preempt the plaintiffs’ 
various common law claims. Although this Court is concerned with the manageability and 
efficiency of this dual system that Congress has created, this Court must adhere to the language 
of the Act and the precedent established by the Supreme Court. Any change in the express 
wording of the statute must come from Congress and any change in the interpretation of such 
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The court also alleged that it is the intent of Congress to not preempt state 
common law claims without citing any legislative history.210 
2.  United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas 
     In Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., the court did not perform a detailed 
analysis of preemption and based its ruling on Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp.211 
Moreover, the court mistakenly relied on a complete preemption analysis 
instead of an express or implied preemption analysis. However, this may be 
due to the lack of such an argument raised by the Defendants. 
     Perhaps the Defendants did not zealously advocate their arguments and 
may have, in fact, actually admitted liability. “For example, Defendants 
appear to concede that Plaintiffs’ claims that hydrofracking or hydraulic 
fracturing is causing foundation damage to their home and sinkholes to 
develop on their property are not preempted.”212 The Defendants  conceded 
that their actions caused damage, hence they conceded to negligence claims. 
If negligence claims are allowed, then all state common law claims would be 
allowed because of the argument that the CAA preempts state common law 
claims. At this point, this court, or any court for that matter, is not likely to 
perform a detailed preemption analysis based upon the Defendants not 
making the argument themselves.213 
VII. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM 
     The argument that the CAA does not preempt state common law claims is 
subject to reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity).214 With regard to 
																																								 																				
wording must come from a higher court. Such a conclusion is entirely consistent with the goals 
an [sic] purposes of the Clean Air Act, as well as the common law.”) (emphasis added). 
210.  Id. at 1284 (“Such a result is clearly not intended under, and would not further the 
goals of, the Clean Air Act.” The court does not cite any evidence to support this statement.). 
211.  Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., No. SA-13-CV-562-XR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109993, 
at *14–15 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013), vacated, No. SA-13-CA-562-XR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
144831 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2013). 
212.  Id. at *10 (emphasis added). 
213.  See MTBE Prods. Liab., 725 F.3d 65, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The parties agree that the 
Clean Air Act and its 1990 Amendments contain no explicit preemption directive expressing 
a Congressional intent to override state tort law, and Exxon does not argue that Congress 
intended to occupy any field relevant here. Rather, Exxon relies on the third form of preemption 
analysis—conflict preemption—to sustain its preemption argument. Accordingly, we address the 
two branches of conflict preemption in turn.”) (emphasis added). 
214.  Reductio Ad Absurdum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“In logic, disproof 
of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.”). Also, for purposes of 
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emissions, an inordinate amount of people on Earth contribute to carbon 
emissions—by driving cars, using electricity, and consuming products 
manufactured in carbon-emitting facilities. There is no reason why fossil fuel 
producers should be held responsible for harms that are generated by these 
activities when consumers partake in said activities as well. With so many 
intervening factors, it is absurd to argue that fossil fuel producers should be 
responsible for the aforementioned harms, yet those who consume their 
products should not be  subject to liability. In light of the American Electric 
Power Company decision, which bars claims from entities that directly emit 
carbon dioxide, no corporation should be held responsible for emitting 
carbon dioxide. Thus, if the CAA does not preempt state law, then claims 
may be brought against anyone that partakes in activities that emit carbon 
dioxide. 
     Moreover, the Comer court held that the CAA preempts state common 
law claims because emissions from a producer is too remote for a plaintiff to 
plausibly claim relief.215 The court noted that the actions of the defendants 
needs to be central to the injury suffered by the plaintiffs. In Comer, the court 
held that emissions, commingled with other types of gases over a significant 
period of time, is sufficient to break the causal connection between the 
defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injury.216 Expanding on the court’s 
reasoning, fossil fuel producers should not be held liable for state common 
law claims if other intervening factors (i.e. consumers) use their products. 
For example, if A sells B a vehicle and B uses the vehicle which emits carbon, 
A is not liable as the cause in fact of B’s emissions; or if A sells B livestock, 
such as a cow, and the cow emits carbon, A is not liable as the cause in fact of 
B’s cow’s emissions. 
     Even though there are multiple sources of a state law claim, often only a 
sole defendant or multiple defendants with deep pockets face lawsuits. Under 
Gutierrez, a claim may be brought against a source of pollution once it is 
identified as causing the pollution, even if there are multiple sources.217 Due 
																																								 																				
clarification, this Article is making the specific argument that holding the CAA does not 
preempt state common law tort claims will lead to absurd results.  
215.  Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 867–68 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).  
216.  Id. at 868 (“The assertion that the defendants’ emissions combined over a period of 
decades or centuries with other natural and man-made gases to cause or strengthen a 
hurricane and damage personal property is precisely the type of remote, improbable, and 
extraordinary occurrence that is excluded from liability. Therefore, the Court finds that the 
plaintiffs have not asserted a plausible claim for relief under state law.”). 
217.  See Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1285–86 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (“The 
Clean Air Act does not preempt source-state common law claims against a stationary source. 
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to multiple sources, it is absurd to argue that a specific fossil fuel producer is 
liable when it is not clear whether or not the last wrongdoer’s intervening tort 
cut off the original wrongdoer’s liability. One scholar promulgates, “In those 
cases in which proximate cause becomes an issue, the plaintiff usually wants 
to sue the original wrongdoer because that person has more available assets 
or is not a friend or neighbor.”218 Thus, holding that the CAA does not 
preempt state common law claims may have deleterious effects. For example, 
a fossil fuel producer—a deep pocket—may be the original wrongdoer, and a 
friend or neighbor—not a deep pocket offender—may add to the wrongdoing 
and be responsible for the vast majority of the tort. The fossil fuel producer 
may face liability, and the friend or neighbor may not face any liability. The 
CAA is intended to establish air quality controls219 and not to set up a 
framework to exploit persons with deep pockets. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
     The CAA is a comprehensive statute that has undergone significant 
amendments by Congress. While states do have the ability to create plans, 
they are subject to the approval of the federal government. States do not have 
autonomy under the CAA.220 States operate under the supervision of the 
federal government according to the cooperative federalism framework.221 
																																								 																				
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that these two causes of action are hereby 
UNCONSOLIDATED AND REMANDED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), to the state courts 
from which they came, because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address these 
purely state common law claims involving non-diverse parties.”). 
218.  Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 302 (2002). 
219.  David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. 
REV. 48, 48 (1980) (“Under section 109, the EPA sets standards of ambient air quality designed 
to make the air harmless to public health and welfare. Under section 110, subject to federal 
supervision, the states submit plans for the ‘implementation’ or attainment of the ambient 
standards. These plans contain enforceable limitations on emissions from various sources, at 
levels calculated to assure compliance with air quality standards.” (footnotes omitted)). 
220.  Once EPA sets the NAAQS, states draft State Implementation Plans (SIPs) (42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a) (2006)). If the EPA approves a SIP, federal agencies may not approve or fund any 
activity that does not conform to the SIP. If the EPA does not approve a SIP because it does 
meet the standards of NAAQS, and the state fails to correct the problem, it becomes subject to 
sanctions in the form of withdrawal of federal highway funding and the imposition of a two-
for-one offset requirement as a condition of permitting any new stationary sources (See, e.g., 
Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A Defense of Minimum 
Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67, 91–95 (2001)). 
221.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006) (NAAQS sets standards of criteria pollutants and review 
and revise standards, as may be appropriate (42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2006)). These standards are 
binding and enforceable against all states, rather than directly against facilities. See Nicholas 
Knoop, Cooperative Federalism and Visibility Protection Under the Clean Air Act, 43 B.C. 
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     Courts that hold that the CAA does not preempt state laws rely solely on 
explicit preemption. The aforementioned courts do not explore other types 
of preemption, such as implicit preemption or obstacle preemption. 
Moreover, said courts confuse explicit preemption with implicit preemption 
by holding that explicit language will indicate the intent of Congress. These 
courts fail to look at the structure or purpose or objective of the CAA to 
ascertain the intent of Congress.  
     If courts hold that the CAA does not preempt state laws, the law is subject 
to an absurdity argument. In Massachusetts v. EPA,222 the EPA admitted to 
the reductio ad absurdum223 and relied on it to defend its “Tailoring Rule.”224 
The EPA made an “Endangerment Finding” under section 202(a) of the 
CAA, which was the catalyst for imposing greenhouse gas emission standards 
for new motor vehicles.225 The EPA then issued its “Triggering Rule”226 for 
greenhouse gas emission standards for stationary sources under the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V of the CAA.227 
This, in turn, would have extended its requirements to all sources, including 
those that are small. It would be absurd for small sources to bear the expense 
and administrative burden of these requirements.228 As a result, the EPA 
																																								 																				
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. E. SUPP. 1, 2–3 (2016) (“In accordance with the cooperative federalism 
framework, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes air quality standards, and 
the states implement those standards, subject to federal oversight.”). 
222.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
223.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 411 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Finally, for 
the first time in its brief, EPA relies on the absurd results doctrine, which embodies ‘the long-
standing rule that a statute should not be construed to produce an absurd result.’” (quoting 
Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998))) (emphasis 
added). 
224.  See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gases Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
225.  See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538). 
226.  Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, et al., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014). 
227.  Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants 
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 50, 51, 70, 71). 
228.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 412 (“But the Deferral Rule cannot rest on 
the Tailoring Rule’s invocation of the absurd results doctrine for a simple reason: the two rules 
are aimed at different absurd results. The Tailoring Rule was intended to alleviate the crushing 
administrative burden on permitting authorities and sources, see Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 31,547. . . .”). 
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issued a “Tailoring Rule,” which essentially rewrote the statutory emission 
standards. In addition to having different rules based on size, there are 
causation issues. 229 Thus, even though there may be a small emitter of 
greenhouse gases, it may contribute to a larger emission of greenhouse gases 
from numerous parties, and it would be impossible to determine who is 
liable. There are causation problems with determining the damage because it 
cannot reasonably be stated that only a few parties are directly emitting 
carbon dioxide.230 To rule otherwise would lead to absurd results.231  
     If courts properly perform preemption analysis, they will arrive at the 
conclusion that the CAA preempts state common law claims. 
																																								 																				
229.  See supra Part VII. Reductio Ad Absurdum. 
230.  Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Oct. 
2, 2019) (“This annual report estimates the total national greenhouse gas emissions and 
removals associated with human activities across the United States.”) (acknowledging that 
people and corporations partake in activities that contribute to carbon emissions, and it is 
impossible to track in a granular manner). 
231.  Reductio Ad Absurdum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“In logic, disproof 
of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.”). See also Max 
Birmingham, Paid in Full: Interpreting and Defining “Market Value” Under the Lacey Act,” 25 
ANIMAL L. REV. 125 (2019) (see § V, absurdity section, which discusses how the absurd results 
if courts accept the argument that laypersons did not understand the Lacey Act, as well as how 
this defense violates the legal maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (“ignorance of 
the law excuses not”)); Max Birmingham, Whistle While You Work: Interpreting Retaliation 
Remedies Available to Whistleblowers in the Dodd-Frank Act, 13 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1 (2017) 
(see § VII, absurdity section, which discusses how a broad interpretation of a whistleblower 
statute will lead to absurd results); Max Birmingham, Strictly for the Birds: The Scope of Strict 
Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 13 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1, 14–15 
(2017) (discussing a court that departed from a plain meaning interpretation of the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) based on reductio ad absurdum arguments). 
